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Abstract— A series of pilot-in-the-loop flight simulation 
studies were conducted at NASA Langley Research 
Center to evaluate indicators aimed at supporting the 
flight crew’s awareness of problems related to energy 
states. Indicators were evaluated utilizing state-of-the-
art flight deck systems such as on commercial air 
transport aircraft. This paper presents results for four 
technologies: (1) conventional primary flight display 
speed cues, (2) an enhanced airspeed control indicator, 
(3) a synthetic vision baseline that provides a flight path 
vector, speed error, and an acceleration cue, and (4) an 
aural airspeed alert that triggers when current airspeed 
deviates beyond a specified threshold from the selected 
airspeed.  
Full-mission high-fidelity flight simulation studies 
were conducted using commercial airline crews. Crews 
were paired by airline for common crew resource 
management procedures and protocols. Scenarios 
spanned a range of complex conditions while emulating 
several causal factors reported in recent accidents 
involving loss of energy state awareness by pilots.  
Data collection included questionnaires administered 
at the completion of flight scenarios, aircraft state data, 
audio/video recordings of flight crew, eye tracking, pilot 
control inputs, and researcher observations. 
Questionnaire response data included subjective 
measures of workload, situation awareness, complexity, 
usability, and acceptability. This paper reports relevant 
findings derived from subjective measures as well as 
quantitative measures.  
Keywords—Energy state, flight deck automation, aircraft 
state awareness, decision making, aviation safety, flight 
deck simulation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a series of planned experiments (referred to as 
the Automation and Information Management 
Experiments, or AIME), technology concepts to 
promote aircraft state awareness (ASA) are being 
evaluated at NASA Langley Research Center. A 
Boeing 787 (B-787) flight deck configuration was 
chosen as the reference platform onto which the ASA 
technologies would be inserted. Data collection for 
AIME 1 (late 2015 – early 2016) [1 - 6], AIME 2 (mid 
2018) [7 - 11], and AIME 2.5 (late 2018 – early 2019) 
have been completed. Data collection for AIME 3 is 
planned for summer/fall 2019. The goal of these 
experiments is to demonstrate and evaluate 
technologies to improve ASA in a relevant 
environment across a span of conditions associated 
with potential loss of ASA.        
Over the course of the AIME experiments 
completed to date, the following technologies have 
been evaluated: 
• Trajectory Prediction System (TPS) on the 
Navigation Display (ND) and Vertical 
Situation Display (VSD) AIME 1, 2.5 
• Predictive Alerting of Energy (PAE) problems 
on Engine-Indicating and Crew Alerting 
System (EICAS), ND, and VSD. AIME 1, 2.5 
• System Interaction Synoptic (SIS)/enhanced 
Synoptics (eSyn) on Synoptics display with 
simplified electronic checklists (sECL). AIME 
1, 2, 2.5 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200002718 2020-05-24T04:42:06+00:00Z
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• Maneuver Envelope (ME) estimation on the 
Primary Flight Display (PFD).  AIME 1 
• Enhanced Airspeed Control Indicator (EACI); 
on the PFD. AIME 2 
• Stall Recovery Guidance (SRG) on the PFD. 
AIME 2 
• Flight path vector (FPV), speed error tape, and 
acceleration caret (HUD-type symbology) on a 
Synthetic Vision System (SVS) PFD [referred 
to as “FPV” configuration]. AIME 2.5 
• Aural Airspeed Alerting (AAA) in conjunction 
with FPV configuration AIME 2.5  
This paper compares results for EACI, FPV, and 
AAA ASA technology concepts to a conventional 
PFD (baseline condition or “BL” in Fig. 1) across 
similar experimental scenarios with loss of airspeed 
events. 
II. TECHNOLOGIES DISCUSSED  
The “EACI” configuration is an enhancement to 
the conventional PFD airspeed tape (Fig. 2) and 
indicates whether the auto-flight system (including 
auto-throttles) is actively controlling to a target 
airspeed [12]. EACI was implemented as additional 
display elements on a standard blue-over-brown PFD. 
When airspeed is not actively controlled by the 
automation, whites XX’s are shown: 
• at the commanded speed indicator at the top of 
the airspeed tape, 
• at the boxed current airspeed indicator in the 
center of the airspeed tape, and 
• at the airspeed bug location as set in the MCP 
or FMS. 
The FPV configuration augmented a conventional 
PFD with HUD-type symbology (flight path vector, 
speed error tape, and acceleration caret) and synthetic 
vision imagery (Fig. 3). This SVS PFD with HUD-
type symbology concept has been studied extensively 
as a mitigation for spatial disorientation 
incidents/accident [13 – 15], but it has not been 
specifically tested for mitigating loss of airspeed 
awareness. 
The “AAA” configuration triggers an “airspeed” 
or “airspeed, airspeed” aural callout when current 
airspeed deviates from the selected airspeed by 10 
knots or more than 20 knots, respectively. AAA was 
implemented in conjunction with the FPV 
configuration (flight path vector, speed error tape, 




The AIME experiments were conducted in the 
Research Flight Deck (RFD) within the Cockpit 
Motion Facility (CMF) at NASA Langley Research 
Center (Fig. 4). The RFD is a high fidelity, full-motion 
flight simulator and was configured to emulate B-787 
displays.  
B. Flight Deck Layout 
Boeing 787-like flight deck displays and layout 
served as the reference condition (Fig. 5). The Lower 
Multi-Function Display (LMFD), served primarily as 
the pilot interface to the Flight Management System 
(FMS). Air Traffic Control (ATC) data link messages 
were displayed inboard of the Electronic Flight Bags 
(EFB). EACI, FPV, and AAA could be activated to 
supplement this baseline. 
 
 




Fig. 2. EACI display at 10 kt airspeed loss after 
autothrottle failure. White XX’s indicate automation 
is not controlling to target airspeed. 
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Fig. 3. FPV display at 10 kt airspeed loss after 
autothrottle failure. Note acceleration caret and speed 
deviation box below left wing of FPV symbol. 
 
 
Fig. 4. RFD interior.  
 
Fig. 5. AIME flight deck display layout.  
C. Test Subjects 
For the AIME experiments, commercial airline 
pilots flew scripted scenarios in the RFD. Captains and 
First Officers from the same airline were paired to 
ensure common operational procedures. The Captain 
flew in the left seat of the flight deck and the First 
Officer flew in the right for the duration of the test. 
Each crew began with a few runs for familiarization 
with the simulator and the new technologies. Data 
collection runs followed these training runs [16]. Data 
were collected individually from the pilot flying (PF) 
and the pilot monitoring (PM). The Captain and First 
Officer alternated PF/PM roles periodically so that 
each pilot assumed each role for about half the 
scenarios. Roles were not changed during flights, only 
between. 
D. Scenarios 
AIME flight scenarios spanned a range of 
conditions designed to help expose state awareness 
issues where the technologies under evaluation could 
prove useful. The scenarios were designed to emulate 
some of the causal factors reported in accidents 
involving loss of ASA. They were also intended to 
immerse flight crews in a complex operational 
environment with high-density traffic, adverse 
weather, both voice and data link ATC 
communications, RNAV and RNP arrivals, and off-
nominal events. The off-nominals were intended to 
help expose state awareness issues and/or to mimic 
relevant accidents/incidents involving loss of ASA. 
Scenario flight times were about 15-20 minutes. There 
were three AIME 2 and three AIME 2.5 scenarios 
designed to induce low energy events. The salient 
events in these scenarios are noted below: 
 
AIME 2 Scenario 3a. Autothrottle (A/T) fails on 
approach  
• Inbound to JFK ILS 4R 
• Cleared for approach 
• At 1200 ft Above Ground Level (AGL), A/T 
fails silently  
• Run ends at go around or landing 
AIME 2 Scenario 3b. A/T fails in hold 
• Inbound to JFK RNAV 13L 
• Message to hold at CAMRN  
• Descending through 11500 ft Mean Sea 
Level (MSL) to enter hold, A/T fails silently  
• Concurrent distraction message for runway 
change to ILS 13L  
• Run ends when crew detects A/T not 
engaged 
AIME 2 Scenario 4b. A/T fails in cruise 
• Takeoff from DCA  
• Inbound to JFK RNAV 13L 
• In cruise, A/T fails silently  
• Concurrent distraction message for traffic 
ahead 
• Run ends when crew notices A/T not 
engaged  
AIME 2.5 Scenario 5a. A/T retards due to radio 
altimeter (RA) failure on approach 
• Inbound to JFK ILS 4R 
• At 1100 ft AGL, RA reports -8 ft. 
• Rollout flare modes armed, so A/T retards  
• Concurrent distraction message for rejected 
takeoff ahead on 13L  
• Run ends at go around or landing 
AIME 2.5 Scenario 7a. A/T fail (off-nominal event 1) 
and blocked pitot system (off-nominal event 2) in 
hold 
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• Inbound to JFK RNAV 13L 
• Message to hold at CAMRN  
• Descending through 11500 ft MSL to enter 
hold, A/T fails silently (event 1)  
• Concurrent distraction message for runway 
change to ILS 4R  
• Once crew detects A/T not engaged (end of 
event 1), principal investigator triggers a 
datalink  message (initiation of off-nominal 
event 2)  to descend in the hold  
• At 9000 ft MSL, total pitot system blockage 
(event 2)  
• EICAS message  for unreliable airspeed 
• AOA speed indicated on Captain’s PFD  
• Inoperative: flight directors, autopilot, A/T  
• Run ends when crew completes unreliable 
airspeed checklist 
 
AIME 2.5 Scenario 7b. A/T fails in cruise 
• Takeoff from DCA  
• Inbound to JFK RNAV 13L  
• In cruise, A/T fails silently  
• Concurrent distraction message for traffic 
ahead 
• Run ends when crew recognizes A/T not 
engaged 
AIME 2 scenario 4b and AIME 2.5 scenario 7b are 
the same scenario. AIME 2 scenario 3a and AIME 2.5 
scenario 5a are designed to emulate the same accident. 
In 3a the autothrottle silently fails with little pitch 
movement. It was desired to test the symbology 
without using significant display movement. The 
limited pitch movement results in a slower speed bleed 
off and more time to check the error. In 5a, the radio 
altitude failure triggers a flight control mode change 
and the autoland systems transitions into flare and idle, 
even though the aircraft is still airborne. This is the 
actual accident scenario. Pitch movement is noticeable 
but airspeed bleeds off much more quickly resulting in 
less time to catch the error before stall warning. AIME 
2 scenario 3b and AIME 2.5 scenario 7a are exactly 
the same through autothrottle failure and recovery. For 
7a an additional pitot failure was inserted at the end of 
the scenario to test synoptic and checklist functions. 
This allows for a between subjects comparison of 
airspeed awareness results across AIME 2 and 2.5 
experiments with the exception of some complexity 
and workload measurements due to the additional 
failures. 
E. Data Collection 
During each flight, objective data were recorded 
including aircraft state parameters, audio, video, and 
eye tracking. In addition, for the scenarios described 
in Section III D, the researcher noted the elapsed time 
from A/T failure until pilot recognition of this event 
(i.e., began manually controlling A/T). After each 
flight, subjective data were collected from each pilot 
including perceived complexity, workload, situational 
awareness, and the usability and acceptability of the 
technology concepts. After the last flight for each 
crew, pilot comments and feedback were gathered in a 
summary debrief. In the sections below, relevant 
findings from the objective and subjective data are 
reported. Representative pilot comments on the 
technologies are provided as well. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
The scenarios used to evaluate EACI, FPV, and 
AAA were flown both with and without the 
technology active. Table I below shows the 
distribution of completed questionnaires (Q’s) for the 
four technology configurations.  
TABLE I. COMPLETED POST-RUN QUESTIONNAIRES 












3b - Hold 
EACI 14 
BL 12 




















A. Pilot recognition of airpeed loss 
The following discussion assumes the addition of 
synthetic vision to the display format from AIME 2 to 
AIME 2.5 does not contribute in a meaningful way 
during the scenarios tested and that the better airspeed 
awareness was due to symbology and aural cues alone. 
There are two components that may have an 
interaction. The scenarios utilized thrust loss with an 
associated reduction in speed. Research shows that 
textured synthetic vision displays can be effective in 
determining ego speed but the effect is minimal at 
higher altitudes such as those used in the testing. Pitch 
changes may be more noticeable with SVS, and the 
pitch attitude did increase with airspeed loss while 
maintaining altitude. This pitch change was slow and 
subtle and not felt to contribute to awareness of 
airspeed loss. 
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The median airspeed loss for the four 
configurations tested during the hold and cruise 
scenarios is shown in Fig. 4. The median airspeed loss 
for EACI, FPV, and AAA were lower than the BL 
condition (EACI = 16 kt, FPV = 13 kt, AAA = 13 kt, 
BL =25 kt). Moreover, the spread across the tests may 
reflect the pros and cons of each technology concept. 
For example, the spread when using EACI matches 
that of BL. This is likely because it is so close to the 
BL design and a change to scanning behavior is not 
required. However, to be effective the X’s must be 
noticed and processed and that is where visual-only 
cues can be problematic. In two cases when using 
EACI, pilots did not recognize the speed loss until 
stick shaker was activated [8]. These data points are 
shown outside the BL-like spread. Subjective 
comments indicate that the EACI white X’s might be 
more noticeable by using an additional alerting 
method (e.g., flashing the X’s, aural alerts). On the 
positive side, since EACI showed the loss of 
autothrottle immediately before the aircraft even 
started to decelerate, some pilots noticed the mode 
change and immediately corrected the problem.     
 
Fig. 4. Median airspeed loss collapsed across hold 
and cruise scenarios 3b, 4b, 7a, and 7b. 
The spread when using the HUD-like symbology 
(referred to as FPV) suggests quicker pilot recognition 
of airspeed loss, but some of its potential benefit is 
likely hidden due to limited training and/or experience 
by the crews with HUD-like symbology such as a 
flight path vector. As a result, this is likely a worst-
case spread that would shrink with training and 
experience with its use. Since the FPV shows energy 
loss due to deceleration before a perceptible difference 
between current speed and selected speed, it may 
result in quicker detection than audio-based alerting 
triggered when current airspeed deviates beyond a 
specified threshold (e.g., 10 kt) from the selected 
airspeed. Even though the HUD-like symbology is 
visual, it is an effective mitigation due to the nature of 
the location of the symbology. That is the primary 
indication of the flight of the aircraft and when 
monitoring the automation, the FPV is in the area with 
the most critical information of how well the 
automation is tracking the desired aircraft parameters. 
It is in the primary field of vision, even when 
monitoring the automation. 
The smallest spread and median value was 
observed using AAA. In contrast to FPV, this may 
represent a best-case spread as very limited training is 
required to understand and utilize the concept. The 
error value was carefully designed to eliminate false 
alarms, even in turbulence, when the automation is 
controlling speed. There were few false alarms noted 
during testing, even during hand flown segments such 
as the departure, but further study may be required. 
These cons associated with audible alerts could 
increase the spread and/or possibility of missed 
recognitions but the audio component here was also 
persistent after every 10 knot deviation. This design is 
intended to reduce the probability of missed detection 
leading to a catastrophic event since multiple audio 
alerts are provided for the event. One negative aspect, 
but maybe not significantly relevant operationally, is 
the audio alert is designed with a threshold to prevent 
nuisance alerts. Even in some turbulence cases the 10 
knot threshold would be exceeded with the auto 
throttle engaged. Detection below 10 knots is likely 
due solely to mode recognition. Due to aircraft 
dynamics, one test run resulted in the first aural 
airspeed alert to be triggered at 20 knots deviation 
from commanded airspeed instead of the 10 knot 
deviation trigger used in the other runs.  
B. Complexity, Workload, and Situational 
Awareness 
1) Complexity  
After each flight, pilots rated the complexity of 
four elements: (1) the task, (2) operational 
environment, (3) system/automation, (4) information 
provided. Each factor was rated from 1 (not complex) 
to 10 (extremely complex). Because the rating for each 
element tended to track with the other elements for a 
given scenario, the four elements are averaged below 
into a single rating for simplicity.  
Table II shows the average complexity ratings for 
the four technology configurations. 
TABLE II. AVERAGE COMPLEXITY  
Scenario BL EACI FPV AAA 
App (3a/5a) 5.4 5.2 5.7 6.3 
Hold (3b/7a) 4.9 5.3 6.0 7.1 
Cruise (4b/7b) 4.9 3.6 3.5 3.0 
 
Average complexity ranged from a low of 3.0 for 
scenario 7b to a high of 7.1 for scenario 7a, which 
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exposed the pilots to cascaded system failures.    
Although scenarios 3b and 7a (through event 1) are 
largely equivalent, in 7a crews had the additional 
burden of having to deal with unreliable airspeed 
information due to blocked pitot tubes.  
As described in Section III D, one of the 
research objectives was to test the technologies in a 
complex environment. These scores validate that this 
research objective was met. 
2) Workload (WL) 
Perceived workload was measured using the 
NASA Raw Task Load Index (RTLX) [17 - 19].  
RTLX derives an overall workload score based on 
the unweighted average of ratings of six subscales 
(mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, 
performance, effort, and frustration level). Each 
subscale rating, except performance, is scored on a 
scale of 0 (very low) to 100 (very high). Performance 
is scored on a scale of 0 (perfect) to 100 (failure). 
Tables III shows the mean perceived workload for 
the AIME 2 and 2.5 low-energy scenarios.  
TABLE II. WORKLOAD  
Scenario BL EACI FPV AAA 
App (3a/5a) 43.9 40.9 49.7 57.7 
Hold (3b/7a) 48.1 45.8 50.7 58.9 
Cruise (4b/7b) 38.8 34.5 13.9 26.2 
 
Workload ranged from 13.9 (low workload) for 
scenario 7b to 58.9 (moderate workload) for scenario 
7a, with its cascaded system failures. Moderate 
workload levels (value between 40 and 60) were 
observed for all 4 technologies in the approach and 
hold scenarios. Low (value less than 20) to moderately 
low (value between 20 and 40) workload levels were 
observed for the technologies during the cruise 
scenario. 
3) Situational Awareness  
Situational awareness (SA) was measured by using 
the 3-D Situational Awareness Rating Technique 
(SART) [20]. It calculates SA based on three 
dimensions: (1) Demand on pilot attentional resources, 
(2) Supply of pilot attentional resources, and (3) 
Understanding by the pilot of the situation. Pilots rated 
these after each flight on a scale of 0 (very low) to 100 
(very high). From these, SA is calculated as: 
     SA = Understanding – (Demand – Supply) 
Table IV shows SA for the AIME 2 and 2.5 low-




TABLE IV. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Scenario BL EACI FPV AAA 
App (3a/5a) 75.5 69.9 61.8 21.9 
Hold (3b/7a) 59.0 81.1 60.5 9.4 
Cruise (4b/7b) 74.3 96.6 130.3 110.7 
 
Situational awareness ranged from a high of 130.3 
with the FPV technology in cruise scenario 7b to a low 
of 9.4 for AAA  in hold scenario 7a, with its cascaded 
system failures.  
Augmenting the PFD with EACI symbology led to 
increased SA compared to the baseline condition for 
the hold and cruise scenarios. The approach scenario 
with A/T failure shows an apparent decrease in SA 
with EACI compared to baseline condition but these 
differences are not operationally significant. 
Similarly, augmenting the conventional PFD, with 
HUD-like symbology (FPV configuration), led to 
increased SA compared to baseline for the hold and 
cruise scenarios. HUD-like symbology did not appear 
to provide any improvements with SA over the 
baseline for the approach scenario.  
SA was lower with AAA than FPV in all scenarios. 
This result may have been due to the pilots reacting to 
aural airspeed alert by immediately manually 
controlling speed with A/T before determining what 
led to the decay in airspeed.  
Finally, the scenario 7a AAA results for 
complexity, workload, and situational awareness were 
noticeably affected by combining two negative events 
(A/T failure and unreliable airspeed) in one run. This 
is a lesson learned for the research team. 
 
C. Usability and Acceptability 
After each EACI or AAA flight, the PF and the PM 
independently rated both the acceptability and the 
usability of the technology used in that scenario. 
Usability and acceptability were not assessed for BL 
and FPV.  
After every scenario flown, each pilot rated the 
acceptability of the subject technology on a 1 to 7 
scale. Where 
1 = Very unacceptable. I did not like the 
technology and would not use it in normal 
operations. 
4 = Average. I liked the technology and would use 
it in normal operations, but would like to see some 
improvements. 
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7 = Very acceptable. I like the technology very 
much and would use it without any improvements.  
Usability was assessed with the System Usability 
Scale (SUS) [21 - 23]. SUS scores can range from 0 to 
100, but they are not percentile ranks. However, they 
can be converted to percentile ranks. As a way to 
intuitively interpret SUS scores, [24] proposed a 
correlation between SUS scores and letter grades. 
Based on extensive research [23] showed specific 
letter grades can be associated with corresponding 
SUS score ranges. This mapping is used here to put the 
SUS scores in the context of letter grades.  
Usability and acceptability results for common 
scenarios of A/T failure in hold and cruise are shown 
in Fig. 5. SUS scores, means with ± 2 standard errors 
(SE), are shown as multi-color bar graphs (referencing 
left y-axis scale) and acceptability scores are shown as 
red circles with mean values listed adjacent to them 
(referencing right y-axis scale).Self-reported post-run 
ratings indicated that pilots judged the pilot interfaces 
to be usable and acceptable for the EACI and AAA 
concepts for hold and cruise operations.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparing EACI and AAA across common 
scenarios 
Across all three scenarios (approach, hold, cruise), 
EACI usability was rated A+ by both PF and PM. 
EACI acceptability was rated high, with a 6.2 by PF 
and 6.0 by PM. AAA was rated more useful and 
acceptable for the PM than the PF. Usability was A+ 
for PM but B for PF. Acceptability was rated 6.4 by 
PM but 5.3 by PF. More training and/or work may be 
needed to mature the AAA technology to the benefit 
of the PF and the scores may be confounded with the 
additional failures encountered with the AAA 
scenarios. 
D. Pilot comments 
Discussions between pilots, and between pilots and 
researchers, were held after each run and during the 
post-experiment debriefs. Representative comments 
for EACI and AAA are noted below. 
 
EACI  
1. …very intuitive to see. Maybe add an aural 
warning or tone. 
2. …good idea but not extremely noticeable; 
needs to be more "in your face" 
3. …Good - maybe make the "X" amber or red  
4. …make the XX’s rapid flashing 
5. …would like something less subtle such as 
"A/T OFF" in center of the PFD 
6. … very useful; good to get a visual picture that 
you have a system failure.  
7. …make the trend airspeed arrow change color 
8. …really liked it; clear, and alerted me quickly 
to uncontrolled airspeed. 
9. …very useful for understanding the 
autothrottle state 
10. …the white Xs stood out and made it much 
easier and quicker to recognize the auto-
throttles weren't working. 
11. …as quick or quicker noticeability compared 
to FMA; very user friendly. 
12. …great visual indication for failed 
autothrottles; add XXs to the FMA as well. 
13. …great safety improvement; but add an EICAS 
message. 
AAA 
1. …very effective in the “heat of battle;” 
provides a extra level of safety. 
2. …good for catching failures where thrust is in 
hold mode or fails…essential for hand flying  
3. …outstanding- excellent means to alert crew to 
low or high energy state; will reduce low-speed 
events with A/T disconnected or airspeed inop 
or set incorrectly 
4. ...simple but extremely helpful; you instantly 
focus on airspeed; it would be nice to have the 
FPV/ISEC on the PFD; overall a great system. 
5. …the escalation of alerts provided a sense of 
urgency. The tone, volume and voice got my 
attention to focus on the FPV and speed trend 
arrow. 
6. …I’m a believer in this but the alerts need a 
recognizable hierarchy of alerts and 
commands, e.g., “airspeed” followed by 
”airspeed low”. 
7. …invaluable. 
8. …definitely got my attention; suggest the 
volume go higher at each level; voice was too 
smooth and calm. 
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V. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Results for EACI, FPV, and AAA compared to BL 
were presented in three areas: 
1. Mean airspeed loss prior to pilot recognition was 
lower for all three ASA technologies compared to 
BL. With our limited number of samples, the ASA 
technologies on a PFD with HUD-type 
symbology appear to be more effective for 
airspeed awareness than conventional PFD 
without HUD-type symbology 
• BL airspeed loss was 25 kt. 
• EACI airspeed loss was 16 kt. 
• FPV airspeed loss was 13 kt.  
• AAA airspeed loss was 13 kt.  
By this measure, the AAA and FPV ASA 
concepts employing HUD-type symbology 
outperformed EACI, which did not employ it. In two 
cases using EACI pilots did not recognize airspeed 
loss until stick shaker activation. Current PFDs have a 
lot of information on them and visual-only 
enhancements may not be completely effective for 
energy state awareness. The BL configuration 
noticeably underperformed the ASA technologies for 
this measure.  
2. Complexity, workload, and situational awareness 
as perceived by the pilot were assessed for EACI, 
FPV, AAA, and BL.   
• Complexity scores appear to validate that the 
high-fidelity full-mission flight simulation 
was able to replicate typical crew procedures 
and workload as well as complex off-nominal 
situations as encountered during accidents. 
• Moderate workload levels were reported 
across each of the technologies 
• EACI and FPV improved SA for the pilots 
over the baseline condition. 
• It appears that although pilots recognized 
airspeed loss most quickly with AAA that it 
had a negative effect on their SA compared 
to baseline. They quickly remedied the loss 
of airspeed when the aural alert was activated 
but may not have had an awareness of what 
caused the airspeed loss or they may have 
rated a lack of SA because AAA did not help 
in the failure encountered. No stick shaker 
events were encountered with the AAA or 
FPV technology. 
3. Usability and acceptability were assessed for 
EACI and AAA 
• EACI was rated highly by both PF and PM 
o Usability was rated A+ by both  
o Acceptability was rated 6.2 by PF 
and 6.0 by PM. 
• AAA was rated higher by the PM than the PF.  
o Usability was rated A+ by PM but 
rated B by PF.  
o Acceptability was rated 6.4 by PM 
but rated 5.3 by PF.  
Both EACI and AAA were rated usable and 
acceptable by the pilots.  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
All the technologies tested outperformed the 
baseline and provided mitigations for detecting issues 
with energy awareness. 
FPV performed well in this study but the results 
need to be tempered due to the small number of runs 
in the current study. The results for airspeed loss 
appear to validate the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) recommendation that HUD-like 
symbology may be one of the most effective 
mitigations to loss of energy awareness. Where 
possible, flight path based symbology should be 
strongly considered in light deck designs instead of 
the standard attitude-based displays in common use 
today.  
Aural alerts have been used effectively to 
minimize altitude clearance violations and appear to 
be a simple and effective solution to airspeed 
awareness. The implementation used in the study was 
effective because it was persistent, unlike other aural 
and visual warning that present only once. It helps 
flight crews monitor the automation and supports the 
current visual symbology.  
EACI is effective when noticed. The additional 
visual elements and changing symbology were very 
effective if pilots noticed the changes when they 
occurred. There were times were the visual elements 
just blended into the symbology already present and 
the airspeed loss was not detected until additional 
warnings like stick shaker were activated. 
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